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 Abstract— This paper is based on the perception that science 
and technology policy (STP) in Brazil has followed a steady 
course over the last decades, regardless of each government’s 
particular orientation. In this sense, it has acted almost 
autonomous. The main objective is to analyze in what degree has 
the agenda of science and technology policy actually changed. In 
this sense, we explore this policy's trajectory, emphasizing the 
more recent period. Based on the evidences we found in the 
literature and in policy documents, we conclude that although 
there has been some change in the discourse surrounding STP in 
Brazil, the policy’s agenda itself has not changed significantly. 
We argue that this is due to the policy makers’ rationale 
concerning science and technology.  
 
 
Index Terms— Research community; policy agenda; science 
and technology policy; Brazil 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
razilian science and technology policy (STP) is an object 
of study of great complexity, partly due to its 
characteristics as a means-policy (one that supports and 
permeates many others) and partly to the specificities of the 
peripheral context in which it is developed. The public agenda 
of this policy, which can be understood as its constituting core, 
is the product of a tension between the private agendas of 
various actors such as scientists, bureaucrats, firms, social 
movements, NGOs, the military, etc. [1]. 
It is from the particular architecture of power shaped by the 
actors who participate in the "political game" in every 
historical moment that public policy is shaped. Thus, science 
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and technology policy can adopt different orientations 
(military-driven, economic-driven, for competitiveness, for 
sustainable development, for social inclusion, etc.), so it 
reflects precisely the result of this "game". 
Like any public policy established within the framework of 
the “modern capitalist state” [2], STP serves primarily the 
interests of a few social actors. In Brazil, the research 
community (or the "scientists" as some authors put) is the 
dominant actor in the decision making process that is in charge 
of the construction of the national STP agenda. This means 
that their interests are almost entirely reflected by this public 
policy’s agenda. 
The rationality behind science and technology policy, as 
suggested by international evidence, has been supported since 
the 1950s by the ideas presented in the famous report Science: 
The Endless Frontier, prepared by the director of the 
American Office of Scientific Research and Development, 
Vannevar Bush, and presented to US President Henry Truman 
in 1945 [3, 4]. 
The report carried most of the aspects of the “linear” 
approach to the relationship between science, technology and 
development in later decades. In particular, the notion that 
there could be no progress without scientific and technological 
advances appears clearly in the text produced by Bush. The 
idea that the state would be in charge of promoting those 
research activities is another point clearly pointed out by the 
report. 
Over the six decades that have elapsed since the 
development of this report this notions, which have shaped the 
rationale of research communities all over the world, has 
influenced and legitimized most of what has been done in 
terms of science and technology policy, both in developed and 
developing countries. Besides, it has also favored this 
particular actor – the research community – on several 
occasions. 
Accordingly, an analysis of Brazilian science and 
technology policy indicates that the research community plays 
the role of dominant actor in the agenda-setting process, and 
has done so since the moment of this policy’s 
institutionalization [5]. This fact explains, to a large extent, the 
relative continuity of the actions implemented under different 
administrations, something that seldom happens in other public 
policies, especially in Latin America. 
 The analysis of the behavior of the actors involved with the 
development of science and technology policy in Brazil since 
the time of its institutionalization highlights the political and 
ideological aspects present in the policy-making process. To 
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explore this dynamic over the course of the last few decades is 
our objective here. 
 This paper is divided in four sections, besides this 
introduction. The first two ones present a brief description of 
the trajectory of Brazilian STP, especially in the last few 
decades. The third section focuses on the policy makers’ 
rationale as a crucial explanatory element regarding science 
and technology policy. The last section presents a summary of 
the conclusions based on this analysis. 
 
 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF BRAZILIAN SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY POLICY 
 
Although the constitution of a "scientific culture" in Brazil 
refers to the eighteenth century [6], its effective 
institutionalization occurred in only half of the twentieth 
century. According to Motoyama, the surge of industrialization 
Brazil went through in the 1930s created a need for 
modernization of the administrative apparatus, as well as for 
instruments of governmental action. To meet this need, 
universities and research institutes were created, adjusting the 
science and technology (S&T) system to the needs of the 
productive sector. 
According to the author, “[i]n fact, in the 1930's, Brazil went 
through a modernization process, albeit late. The breakdown 
of the oligarchic society of the coffee barons opened the doors 
to new forms and social structures under the aegis of 
modernity. Following this, there would be cultural, scientific 
and technological transformations” [7: 254, our translation]. 
It is in this context that universities were created in São 
Paulo (University of São Paulo) in 1934, and in Rio de Janeiro 
(University of the Federal District) in 1935. Both universities 
would join in the efforts of laboratories and research institutes 
already established in the country. However, their role would 
differ from other already established institutions: while 
research institutes such as the Campinas Agronomic Institute 
(founded in 1887) and the Institute of Experimental Pathology 
in Manguinhos (founded in 1900 as the Federal Institute 
Serotherapy) were primarily set up to conduct “applied 
research”, the new universities were originally organized with 
the purpose of conducting activities related to "basic research", 
going against the pragmatism of the political authorities of the 
time. 
Thus, the creation of the new universities represented a first 
impulse to respond to the growing demand for qualified 
professionals in Brazil, especially in industry, agriculture and 
public administration. On the other hand, however, the surge 
of industrialization had little impact on Brazil’s technological 
capabilities. That is to say, although the country had managed 
to achieve a considerable transformation in its productive 
structure, the constraints of a peripheral economy, such as the 
concentration of income and wealth, low wages and the 
atrophy of the domestic market still lingered. 
The period prior to the 1950s was also marked by the 
creation of state institutions that had a relevant participation in 
the establishment of the foundations of Brazil’s STP, 
especially during the first Vargas government (1930-1945). 
Examples include the General Board (later National 
Department) of Mineral Production, created in 1933 under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Agriculture and responsible for 
conducting research related to mining activities; the Institute of 
Technology, also created in 1933 and linked to the Ministry of 
Agriculture; and the Institute for Technological Research 
(IPT), under the supervision of the Polytechnic School of Sao 
Paulo, and replacing the Materials Testing Laboratory in 1934. 
These actions were inspired by experiences adopted in the 
USA, in Germany in the UK and in the USSR [7]. 
 Naturally, such initiatives, through which the 
foundations for the institutionalization of science and 
technology policy were set in Brazil, were not only based on 
the needs imposed by the surge of industrialization of the 
1930s and 1940s or the unilateral initiative of the Vargas 
Government. Even then, while the Brazilian research 
community began to emerge, a coalition of academics was 
already advocating for state support to scientific and 
technological development. 
Among the main actors involved in this process were the 
Brazilian Association of Education (ABE) and the Brazilian 
Academy of Sciences (ABC), which performed a similar role 
to the one that would later be played by the Brazilian Society 
for the Development of Science (SBPC), established in 1948 
[8].  
 These actors had a key role in settling the rationality 
of S&T policy in Brazil, in outlining the standards to be 
observed by it and in legitimized the measures undertaken 
under STP to society as a whole. According to Morel, “science 
at that time "became part of the political discourse, and a 
series of measures were taken to make it more productive, 
more effective. Science was valued for its character as a 
productive force, being able to create technology and also 
promote capital accumulation by large business units" [8: 70, 
our translation]. 
 The 1950s is generally acknowledged as a defining 
moment in Brazilian history. They represent a time of 
accelerated modernization of the country’s productive 
structure and the overcoming of a primary exporting model by 
another, supported by modern industry. The Brazilian 
government acted proactively in order to create the basis for 
the country’s heavy industrialization phase, so that it actually 
became a reality, although later interrupted [9]. Actions such 
as the protection of emerging industries, the support for 
domestic and foreign private investment and the creation of 
public enterprises in strategic industrial sectors were at the 
center of this project. 
The transformation of the productive structure in Brazil 
during the 1950s is evidenced by a substantial change in the 
profile of the country’s industry. Especially during Juscelino 
Kubitschek´s government (1956-1961) the production of 
technological dynamic capital goods and durable consumer 
goods increased significantly. 
 It was based on this foundation that Brazilian STP 
was actually institutionalized in the early 1950s. The main 
milestone in this process is the creation of two important 
institutions in 1951: CAPES (Campaign for the Improvement 
  
of Higher Education Personnel, later renamed the Commission 
for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel) and 
CNPq (National Council for Scientific and Technological 
Development). 
CAPES’ mission was to expand and consolidate post-
graduate studies in Brazil; CNPq’s was to support research 
activities, particularly in the field of physics. The creation of 
these two institutions expressed the state’s recognition of the 
importance of scientific and technological development as part 
of a national development strategy and signals the sets the role 
of the state as a systematic supporter of scientific and 
technological activities in Brazil. 
Inserted in Brazil’s modernization project, the genesis of 
CAPES and CNPq synthesized the view that the development 
of science is an absolutely necessary condition for national 
development. This was, in a way, derived from the rationale 
that enveloped STP in developed countries following WWII. 
International organizations such as UNESCO, the Inter-
American Development Bank IDB and the Organization of 
American States (OAS) played an important role in channeling 
this rationale, which was quickly embraced by the Latin 
American research communities [10]. 
This rationale is clearly expressed by Vannevar Bush’s 
Science: the Endless Frontier report. It was precisely this 
rationale that allowed scientific and technological activities to 
receive systematic attention by the governments of several 
countries during this period [3, 11]. In other words, this was 
the factor that assured the maintenance (and, often, expansion) 
of public resources devoted to science and technology during 
the following decades. 
Perhaps the triumph of this rationale, despite the resistance 
of various social groups [4], had only been possible because of 
the prestige enjoyed by the research community since after 
WWII and of the strengthening of the technological culture 
since then, which contributed to the gradual dissociation 
between science, technology and society [11]. These two 
factors made it possible to the research community to displace 
other actors in the "political game" allowing their own 
interests to prevail. 
It is not surprising that this rationale has been adopted and 
disseminated by scientists from all over the world [11] After 
all, the “model” for STP derived from it assured an increased 
funding for S&T and granted a great deal of autonomy to 
researchers, in terms of their practices and their choices of the 
research themes. 
In this sense, the institutionalization of Brazilian STP during 
the 1950s must be understood not only as a reflex of the 
countries’ modernization, but also as a product of a pressure 
from the research community. The establishment of formal 
mechanisms of state support for scientific and technological 
activities constitutes one of the main demands of this actor 
since the early 1950s. Implicitly, the Brazilian research 
community was not only advocating for the creation of 
institutions that could support S&T activities, but also for the 
construction of spaces that would boost its political power. 
The belief system of the Brazilian research community – 
supported by the "endless frontier" rationale – served as a 
rhetoric tool capable of influencing a range of policy choices 
embodied, for example, in the institutional features of CAPES 
and CNPq. It also served as a way of legitimating policy 
choices. After all, when a significant portion of society accepts 
as a fact the idea that scientific and technological advancement 
of any nature is not only desirable but also absolutely 
necessary to ensure progress and welfare, any action that 
presents itself as a guarantee of progress tends to be legitimate. 
 The Military Coup of 1964 was a turning point in Brazilian 
political history. It was also an important milestone for the 
country’s science and technology policy, in which the 
characteristics of the “developmentist” project of the military 
regime were quite evident. Some fields of knowledge, such as 
nuclear physics, petrochemicals and engineering materials, 
which were little explored in Brazil until then (even in 
comparison to other developing countries), received more 
attention, that is to say, more resources. 
Naturally, the research community was, like other segments 
of Brazilian society, a victim of censorship and repression 
during the military regime [12]. However, the perception that 
scientific and technological knowledge is essentially neutral, 
shared by the military regime, allowed the research agenda to 
remain relatively stable over this period. Nevertheless, as 
illustrated by Bautista Vidal’s account [13], there were 
moments in which part of the research community openly 
challenged some actions from the military regime.  
Although scientific and technological development has 
represented an important strategy within the developmentist 
project of the military, it is noteworthy that the volume of 
resources allocated to the area of S & T during the period of 
the military regime (1964 -1985) varied considerably [12]. 
This was not, however, the result of a similar shift in the 
perception that the military had about the importance of 
science and technology within its project. It was only a reflex 
of the uncertainty, instability and economic crises that were 
common during this period. 
A process of bolstering scientific and technological research 
as a tool to support national development began during the 
Costa e Silva administration (1967 - 1969), in which CNPq, in 
particular, served as a strategic institution. This movement was 
supported by the Three-Year Plan (1968-1970), in which S&T 
occupied a key position as instruments for accelerating 
national development. 
Indeed, it was only from 1967 that science and technology 
began to gain prominence in national economic programs, 
being incorporated into the governmental discourse as an 
increasingly important legitimizing element for the military 
regime’s project, and also in the Federal Constitution of 1967, 
establishing the state's duty to encourage both research and 
teaching of science and technology (Article 179). 
Brazilian STP during the military regime was inserted in 
what Velho & Saenz [14] dubbed the "military regime’s 
project of technological autonomy", which aimed to create 
conditions for developing national technologies in order to 
answer to the demands of the local productive sector. 
Again, areas such as physics and chemistry were 
emphasized. Agriculture, energy and aerospace industry were 
some of the sectors that benefited from the key position S&T 
occupied in the national development strategy during the 
military regime. The support given to these areas during this 
period explains the current comparative advantages Brazil 
currently holds in the production of agricultural goods 
(through the support of Embrapa), in underwater oil drilling 
(through Petrobras) and in the production of small-sized 
civilian aircrafts (through Embraer). 
The nationalist spirit of the Brazilian military government 
acted as a powerful social binder around the idea that the 
desired technological autonomy would be achieved. According 
to Velho & Saenz "[t]he context of political, economic and 
social development in the 60s and 70s showed: an 
authoritarian government that had come to power with the 
military coup of 1964, surging and easy access to international 
credit, easy access to developed technologies; exceptional 
growth of the economy; increasing demand for qualified 
professionals. These elements constituted an artificial 
"national consensus" about the idea that the country could 
become a significant actor in the international arena and enable 
the project "Brazil great power" of the military " [14: 23]. 
Some of the main actions of the military government in 
order to promote the so coveted technological autonomy 
involved four main sets of actions [14]: 
i. Protection of the still fragile domestic industries 
through market reserve in strategic sectors; 
ii.  Creation of state owned companies and support 
institutions in strategic industries; 
iii.  Higher education reform (in 1968) and  
iv. Establishment of special funds aimed towards 
promoting scientific and technological activities. 
  These actions illustrate some of the complexity developed 
by Brazilian STP during the period stretching from 1964 to 
1985. In this sense, one cannot ignore the role of the country’s 
research community as an important coalition that advocated 
precisely for the creation of new institutions, for the expansion 
of funding mechanisms and for a greater attention to be paid 
by the state to some disciplinary fields. Thus, during this 
period, one can plainly observe the “endless frontier” rationale 
at work in Brazil, following similar processes in many other 
countries [3]. 
It also must be noted that the research community had and 
still has a central role in setting the agenda for STP in Brazil. 
This actor has been particularly successful in shaping 
“explicit” STP (or the “discourse level”) in order to muster the 
support of several others, notably politicians, bureaucrats and, 
evidently, the military, during the period of the military regime 
[15]. 
 The end of the military regime represented a period of great 
political euphoria. Several groups of different ideological 
orientations postulated to set, each with their own political 
project, the first lines of the new democratic history of Brazil. 
The product of the tension between these different proposals 
eventually materialized a few years later as the 1988 
Constitution. 
Complications associated with the regime change, of course, 
were common. In fact, Brazilian democratic experience was 
still very limited. State institutions, political parties and society 
as a whole would have to learn to operate under a new set of 
rules and practices. The perspectives for Brazil's future as a 
democracy, however, then outweighed any drawbacks 
associated with such lack of experience. 
If the political environment of the late 1980s was favorable, 
the Brazilian economy, facing constraints and uncertainties 
imposed by the “debt crisis”, was in absolute turmoil. In this 
context, structural transformations in the economy, or even the 
upkeep of the GDP growth rates of previous decades, would 
prove to be virtually impossible. 
The characteristics that marked the late 1980s, making it a 
unique period in the history of Brazil, were economic 
stagnation and uncontrolled inflation. These conditions 
compromised the country's own political capacity to respond 
to internal and external challenges. This situation eventually 
led to a symbiotic relationship between economic stagnation 
and financial parasitism during the late 1980s and early 1990s 
[16]. 
The Brazilian model of growth from the 1980s may be 
labeled as an "unstable growth model of low dynamism" [17]. 
Among its main features was a high volatility of the product 
combined with a low average growth rate, characteristics 
which were also common (if not even more severe) in other 
Latin American countries.  
The economic restrictions to which Brazil was submitted 
during the "lost decade" (the 1980s), combined with the 
political turbulence of the democratic transition of that period, 
are elements that should not be ignored when analyzing 
Brazilian science and technology policy in this period. The 
context of hyperinflation, coupled with the constraints 
associated with foreign debt, imposed severe restrictions for the 
strategies that could be adopted in terms of STP, as well as on 
other policies [18]. 
Finally, it is noteworthy that since 1985, there were some 
important changes in the Brazilian national development 
strategy, which became heavily based on attracting capital in 
the form of foreign direct investments and imports of 
machinery and equipment as a path to modernize the national 
productive structure. These changes had significant impacts on 
Brazilian STP. The most important one is related to its agenda, 
which would from then on include topics such as the attraction 
of foreign capital in technology intensive sectors, measures to 
reduce protectionism in emerging industries (such as the 
reduction of import barriers), formal mechanisms for 
protecting intellectual property, etc [14]. 
The somewhat belated creation of the Ministry of Science 
and Technology in 1985 is, however, an event of great 
importance, especially in that which regards the political and 
institutional organization of Brazilian STP. It was the result of 
the mobilization of members of the research community who 
referred to President-elect Tancredo Neves the proposal for 
the new ministry. Neves embraced it and it was implemented 
by Sarney (the Vice President-elect, who would become the 
President following Neves’ death prior to his inauguration). 
The Ministry has since become a key player in the country’s 
STP, formulating policies and programs, reviewing resources, 
and coordinating the actions of other institutions. 
Motivated by a desire to equal the Brazilian S&T indicators 
to those of the USA and of the lead European countries, the 
Ministry implemented the “Technical Training for Industry 
  
Support Program” (PACTI) in 1992, which structured old and 
new policy tools around the axis of university-industry 
relations. From the mid-1990s – and, in particular, during the 
first FHC (Fernando Henrique Cardoso) administration (1994-
1998) – the Ministry of Science and Technology begun to 
forcefully stimulate private R&D efforts and the cooperation 
between firms and public universities and research institutes, 
in order to raise the level of private spending on research in 
Brazil to that of the developed countries [14]. 
The pattern that has since then shaped university-industry 
relations has been dubbed “supplyist”, since it is based on the 
“supply of knowledge” by public universities and research 
institutes, rather than on the “demand” by the productive 
sectors (with the notable exception of companies such as 
Petrobras, heavily fostered by the state) [5]. 
This pattern has been pointed out as an evidence of the 
research community’s influence over the policy’s agenda [14, 
5]. In an attempt to secure new sources of funding for research 
in a context of the shrinking of the state due to the neoliberal 
pressures, public universities and research institutes have 
turned to the private productive sector. Most of the Brazilian 
companies, however, seem to place little importance on 
partnerships with universities. According to PINTEC, a broad 
national innovation survey, 67% of innovative firms declared 
that cooperation with universities were of little or no relevance 
at all to their innovative activities. Only 21% of innovative 
firms qualified these partnerships as highly relevant [19]. This 
may also be considered evidence that the supplyist approach to 
university-industry relations in Brazil seems to be rather one 
sided, benefiting the research community more than it does the 
productive sector. 
One aspect of note is the particular competence shown by 
the Brazilian research community in capturing certain elements 
of discourse and using them as means of legitimating the 
adoption of the supplyist approach. Viotti highlights the 
importance conferred to elements such as "entrepreneurship", 
"business incubators" and "technology parks" by Brazilian 
S&T policy makers. The now common use of these terms is in 
fact directly linked to a fundamental aspect of Brazilian STP 
that dates back from the 1980s: the emergence of technological 
innovation as a fundamental objective of this policy [20]. 
 The discourse of technological innovation has since become 
consistently stronger in Brazil. This is fairly clear, for 
example, in the very document that established the Technical 
Training for Industry Support Program. Naturally, the term 
“innovation” was already present in earlier documents. 
However, it was not a policy core element. Nor was it stressed 
as an absolutely necessary condition (and in some cases a 
sufficient one) to promote economic and social development, 
as has become since the early 1990s. 
 
 
III. BRAZILIAN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY IN RECENT 
YEARS 
 
A more recent development that also illustrates this shift in 
the discourse of Brazilian STP was the institution of the 
Industrial, Technological and Foreign Trade Policy (PITCE) 
in 2003. PITCE had the explicit goal of "encouraging to 
change the competitive standing of the Brazilian industry 
based on differentiation and product innovation" [21: 83, our 
translation]. 
The document containing the general guidelines that would 
later be incorporated into PITCE emphasized that the 
horizontal axes of this policy would be, in addition to the 
innovation and technological development, the insertion of the 
external economy (through international trade competition) 
and industrial modernization. 
In this sense, Arruda, Vermulm and Hollanda stated that 
PITCE would be essentially different from the policies of the 
1960s and 1970s, focusing on the development and expansion 
of industrial bases in the country, and also different from those 
of the 1990s, whose focus was the stimulating competitiveness 
[21]. In fact, the differences among the PITCE and 
"developmentalist" policies of the 1960s and 1970s are very 
significant to be disregarded. However, we believe that PITCE 
is not sufficiently distinct from the policies of the 1990s in its 
essence. The focus on technological innovation represents a 
refinement of the ambiguous focus on competitiveness rather 
than a consistent change in policy paradigms. 
Although the shift towards “competitiveness” and 
“innovation” in the policy discourse level dates back to the 
mid 1980s, it was only in the mid 2000s that it began to 
consistently permeate S&T policies. Two laws that were 
sanctioned by the National Congress during this period 
effectively consolidated innovation as a main element of 
Brazilian STP: Law nº 10.973/04 (“the innovation law”) and 
Law nº 11.196/05 ("the law of good"). 
As its name indicates, technological innovation occupies a 
central important role in the innovation law. It also shows 
other features common to the trajectory of Brazilian PCT, as 
the deal, the argument of the importance of partnerships 
between universities and business companies, besides the 
focus on high technology 
The law of good, in turn, represents an important addition to 
the Innovation Law, whose characteristics overly broad would 
add little in terms of operability to the legislation. It has been 
criticized, besides, by supporting only those companies with 
system calculation of real taxable income. That is to say, in 
practice this law benefits the large companies (often the one 
with foreign capital) to the detriment of those small and 
medium business ones. 
Based on the analysis of policy documents and evidences of 
their application, it is clear that, despite some major changes 
(being its "privatization" the main one), there is little 
difference between the general characteristics of Brazilian STP 
in the post-1985 an those from the earlier period (1950-1985). 
Thus, it is noteworthy that this policy has been marked by its 
continuity through successive governments, something unusual 
among the set of public policies within the Latin American 
context.  
From the military dictatorship to the democratic renewal, 
from conservative to progressive governments, the core of 
Brazilian STP policy has surprisingly preserved most of its 
core aspects. Legitimized by both the discourse of rationality 
and the research community, they have, as we argued, 
benefited this actor significantly, ensuring their access to 
public resources, and large portion of autonomy.   
The "privatization" of the PCT in course since the mid 
1980s, however, represents an important new element, which 
was enough to qualify as a new pattern, different from the 
previous one. There was no paradigm shift, though: rather, this 
represented a new phase within the same paradigm. 
 The national development bias that influenced Brazilian 
scientific and technological policy until 1985 was displaced by 
a managerial rationality. But the research community still 
remained as the dominant actor behind his policy (one could 
say that, in some cases, this position was even stronger). 
 Especially since the 1980s, the research community’s 
discourse began to incorporate as its central element the idea 
that technological innovation is the main engine of economic 
development. It also has since then greeted the private 
company as the privileged locus for the generation of such 
innovations. Implicitly, however, Brazilian STP has long 
overlooked the demands of companies, which were not 
concerned about R&D inner activities, but rather with 
mechanisms that would allow them to import foreign 
equipment at lower costs. As Viotti argues, this has been the 
dynamics of the Brazilian “Passive Learning System” (as 
opposed to the “National Innovation Systems” of developed 
countries). Brazilian companies have historically learned how 
to operate foreign technologies without building the skills to 
later develop similar ones [22]. 
The shift in the discourse level, however, is not a trivial 
thing. The importance given to technological innovation and to 
the role of private companies, at first only a strategy for 
legitimating the privileged position of the Brazilian research 
community, has actually become part of this actor’s rationale. 
The business needs and demands are increasingly addressed by 
the scientific and technological policy, as indicated by the 
emphasis on the newly created mechanisms for tax waivers 
guaranteed by the innovation law and the good law. The 
presence of representatives from the business sector is also 
increasingly common in areas where STP is debated. 
The political meaning of these changes must also be made 
clear. The introduction of innovation as an aspect of nuclear 
scientific and technological policy in this period was only 
possible, according to Viotti, because it is not necessarily 
conflicting with some of the basic neoliberal principles, such 
as free enterprise and entrepreneurship [20]. 
In fact, the very concept of innovation, inherently linked to 
private profit, is very adherent to that discourse. This aspect, 
however, has been masked by the widely accepted notion of 
technological innovation as the main force behind economic 
and social development. In this sense, the consensus built 
around this idea is not so different from the “science frontier” 
argument that legitimized STP actions from the mid 1940s. 
As it has been historically benefited from the “supplyist 
model”, within the scientific and technological policy, the 
Brazilian research community did not ally, at first, with the 
advocates of innovation [5]. Probably because it instinctively 
realized that the "focus on innovation" was in conflict with the 
"focus on academic research", meaning that, up until the 
1980s, a shift towards innovation could have meant the 
scattering of research funds between different arenas. This 
tension was solved only when the concept of innovation was 
effectively captured by the research community and became 
viable within its political project. 
The nationalist project of technological autonomy of the 
1960s and 1970s, in which the state and public research 
institutions played a central role came to be replaced by a 
model in which private companies were seen as the central 
actor. Common terms were replaced by new ones: 
“technological change” by “innovation”; “endogenous 
technology production” by “international competitiveness”. In 
this new context, the concept of innovation has been treated as 
a true panacea, the solution to all social and economic 
problems in Brazil. 
The changes observed in the Brazilian scientific and 
technological policy point out, generally, to the growing 
importance of purely economic factors in the formulation, 
implementation and evaluation of these policies, which ends 
up distorting their broader goals. Innovation as a self-
contained goal, as it has been treated by STP, is far from being 
a force that would lead to social and economic development. 
Rather, it has in most cases become a tool through which the 
research community has been able to preserve its control over 
the agenda. 
 It was to be expected that under the Lula Administration – 
which marked the ascension of the Worker’s Party to the 
Presidency – would bring a shift to this logic. A number of 
researchers, STP “think thanks” and worker’s unions greeted 
this as a golden opportunity to shaping a different pattern of 
science and technology policy, one that would actually place 
knowledge production at the service of the poor.  
This, however, did not happen. What did happen was that 
Brazilian STP preserved the same pattern of the 1980s and 
1990s. Innovation for competitiveness was still the core 
element of the policy’s agenda. In the following section we 
explore some of the possible reasons behind these tendencies. 
 
 
IV. THE RATIONALE OF S&T POLICY MAKERS 
 
In this section we introduce some of the foundations of 
policy makers’ views concerning science, technology and 
society relationships, which is in the very core of STP’s 
rationale. 
The rationale may concern a social actor (or group of actors) 
or public policies as a whole. In situations in which the 
architecture of power favors a specific actor, they may try to 
inflict their cognitive model on others. Being successful in this 
attempt, they will impose their cognitive model over the policy 
model. This is what happens, for example, in the case of STP. 
The hegemonic actor (academia) translates its own cognitive 
model into the policy’s model. Perceived as legitimate, that 
actor’s view concerning STS relationships becomes highly 
influential and is also incorporated in the cognitive model of 
other policies, such as SIP, industrial policies, agricultural 
policies, etc. 
  
In this sense, in order to understand some of the 
characteristics of Brazilian STP (and, in particular, its 
inadequate interaction with SIP) it is necessary to explore 
some aspects of policy makers’ views on this subject. That 
implies analyzing academia’s views on STS relationships. 
The socially accepted view understands science as the pure 
representation of an objective truth, thus being superior to 
other forms of interpreting reality, such as religion, myths, 
traditional knowledge, etc.  
If all these forms of understanding reality were different 
lenses that lead to different interpretations, science would be, 
in agreement with the common sense, the only crystalline lens 
that would allow the visualization of the objective truth 
without any distortion. The mechanism that would guarantee 
the execution of that noble task would be the scientific 
method. Given the purity of the method, the result of any 
experiment would be the objective truth. 
Concerning technology, it is important to note that, during 
the last decades, the borders between science and technology 
have been assuming less and less clear contours, making the 
separation of these two objects almost an analytic formality 
(that we will adopt in this work with that exact purpose). In 
fact, it has been observed that science is becoming more and 
more technological, and that technology, in its turn, is 
becoming more and more scientific [23]. 
The understanding of STS relationships that shapes 
academia’s (and STP’s) cognitive model reflects the 
instrumental view of science and technology, conformed to by 
the alliance between the conception of science and technology 
and the recognition of the possibility of human control over 
them [24]. 
The idea of neutrality assumes that S&T are absolutely 
independent of social conditions or, more specifically, of 
social values (political, cultural, ideological, economic, etc.) 
associated with the context in which they are constructed. It is 
as if scientists, when entering a laboratory, left all of their 
values and interests on the outside. 
The instrumental view combines that conception with the 
idea that technology can be fully controlled by society. Science 
and technology are thus understood as mere instruments 
capable of allowing the creation of a better society, if only 
knowledge is used ethically. 
The instrumental view seems to be accepted thoroughly by 
academia, as well as by society as a whole. Surpassing this 
naïve understanding seems to be fundamental for rethinking 
science and the technology and their relationships with society.  
Sarewitz presents five myths, of positivist inspiration, that 
might sustain such an idealized understanding of S&T [3]: 
1. the myth of infinite benefit, based on the belief that more 
science and more technology unavoidably lead to an increase 
of society’s well-being; 
2. the myth of free research, according to which any line of 
reasonable research directed to the understanding of 
fundamental processes of nature will render benefits for 
society, as will any other scientific research; 
3. the myth of responsibility, that states that the mechanisms 
of quality control in scientific research (i.e. peer review) 
ensure the main ethical responsibilities of the research system; 
4. the myth of authority, harnessed to the conception that 
scientific information offers a strictly objective basis for the 
resolution of political disputes;  
5. the myth of autonomy, regarding the idea that knowledge 
generated at science’s frontier would be autonomous of its 
practical social consequences. 
In fact, it is noticed that the “common sense” view is indeed 
much harnessed to those myths. Science and technology are 
generally seen as fundamentally positive forces, instruments 
that celebrate the submission of nature to the human genius 
and indispensable elements for humanity’s progress. 
However, there are no concrete reasons to piously accept 
this “essentialist and triumphalist” conception of science and 
technology [25]. To blindly accept this view seems to be a 
mere act of faith. The irony, here, resides in the fact that faith 
– the mechanism that would guarantee the purity of religious 
“knowledge” – is attacked so hardly by some of the defenders 
of the scientific method, the mechanism that would, in turn, 
guarantee the purity of scientific knowledge. 
As a result of the consolidation of that view, especially 
during the last decades, a paradoxical picture was conformed: 
on one side, S&T are increasingly important elements that 
sustain contemporary societies; on the other, a critical 
understanding of the role that these elements exercise on 
societies is still lacking. Thus, while social actors represent 
users and shapers of S&T, they are still passive to that process. 
This paradoxical picture constitutes Winner’s notion of 
“technological somnambulism” [26]. 
As the progress of science and technology is understood as 
an inherently beneficial process for society, STP assumes a 
“laissez-faire” character. Policy makers assume the attitude 
that stimulating S&T progress will inevitably lead to social 
and economic progress. 
The history of Brazilian STP shows that these elements have 
always been present in the cognitive model of the national 
research community. Two of the country’s main research 
funding agencies, the National Council for Scientific and 
Technological Development (CNPq) and the Coordination for 
the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (CAPES), 
both founded in 1951, clearly translate the main elements of 
this cognitive model. 
CNPq and CAPES are noted for historically having a 
reasonably large and stable budget and have been credited 
(quite correctly) as important actors in the promotion of 
Brazil’s relative success in science outputs (measured, for 
example, by the number of articles published in indexed 
journals), which overshadows the country’s results in the field 
of technology (measured by the number of patents granted). 
Despite their importance, the programs conducted by these 
agencies are seldom evaluated. This is due to the widespread 
belief that scientific and technological development is a goal 
that must be pursued regardless of the cost. Although this 
model has been widely criticized [27, 28] and partially 
abandoned in many countries (in which it was noted that STP 
policy is just like any other public policy and, therefore, not 
above evaluation and social control), it still remains strong in 
Brazil. 
Since the 1990s, Brazilian STP has become closer to 
industrial policies and private companies. Elements such as 
“competitiveness” and “innovation” were incorporated in the 
very core of this policy [20]. However, rather than the result of 
a political pressure from the industrial sector, this was a 
maneuver by the scientific community in order to keep the 
agenda under its control. Being increasingly questioned about 
the low social impacts of its actions, this actor sought 
legitimacy by introducing new elements – those traditionally 
related to the managerial world, not the academic one – to the 
policy agenda [5]. 
Even though it may not have been initially intended, the 
“shift towards competitiveness” in the discourse level of STP 
has greatly benefited private companies in Brazil, both 
national and foreign, since Brazilian laws do not clearly 
distinguish between the two. These elements imprint a strictly 
economic logic to Brazilian STP, increasing its distance from 
socially relevant themes. 
Over the last few years, these tendencies have only been 
reinforced. Although there has been a movement for tipping 
Brazilian STP in more “socially oriented” direction, little has 
been accomplished in this sense. The creation of a Secretary of 
Science and Technology for Social Inclusion under the 
Ministry of Science and Technology in 2004 did little to 
change the broader picture. This might be due to the fact that 
the majority of the resources allocated under the Secretary (R$ 
190 million, roughly some US$ 100 million, or almost 60% of 
the Secretary’s budget) are derived from congressional 
amendments motivated strictly by electoral prospects [29]. 
Political pragmatism and opportunism are not, however, the 
only causes for the lack of effectiveness of socially oriented 
science and technology policies. This is also due to the 
difficulties associated with the interaction of STP and social 
policies, as we have argued. 
The current Brazilian STP pattern is not coherent with 
effective pursuit of social inclusion, as we have argued. To 
achieve a transformation of STP in that sense, it is necessary to 
rethink this policy’s bases as well as the form of building 
science and technology. With that, it would be viable to 
reorient this policy to the objective of social inclusion. The 
convergence between STP and SIP, however, requires the 
employment of an alternative approach, which we have labeled 
“the science and technology approach to social inclusion”, and 
which is presented in a later section of this paper.  
 
 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The analysis of the trajectory of science and technology 
policy in Brazilian allows us to answer a series of questions. 
Three of them, which are often left beside, are of fundamental 
importance. These questions are: which social actors are 
effectively shaping this policy? Who is being benefited by it? 
And what difference does it make? 
Concerning the first of these questions, the evidences that 
we found reinforce an argument that some authors in the field 
of S&T Studies in Latin America have been developing for 
some time: that this policy has an insular character, meaning 
that it is detached from the demands of the vast majority of 
social actors, being dominated by the research community. 
In large measure, the ideological shroud that covers STP is 
the result of the myths that encase science and technology, 
usually understood as forces that inexorably drive economic 
and social progress and as a field that competes only to 
scientists and engineers. 
This is not, however, the only factor that explains the insular 
character of the Brazilian STP. Both the political and 
institutional architecture on which the policy rests is, as it 
might be expected, a noteworthy element. This policy has 
historically been run by a limited number of agencies linked to 
the federal administration, among which CAPES, CNPq and 
FINEP. This policy centralization imprints a top-down system 
of policy making, making it more difficult to involve other 
social actors and eliminating the possibility of making it more 
pluralistic and democratic. 
One also has to consider the importance of another factor 
that gives the Brazilian STP its insular character is related to 
the short experience the country has had in terms of public 
policy making in a democratic context. The effective 
incorporation of new actors in the shaping of public policies 
involves, after all, a learning process. Although this is already 
occurring in several areas and in many different ways, setting 
of S&T policy’s agenda remains out of bounds to actors such 
as social movements and NGOs, whose participation is limited 
to marginal issues. 
This statement, however, should not be understood in its 
strictest sense. In fact, this policy has historically ignored the 
possibility of working on social problems, such as, hunger, 
poverty, inequality, etc. But it has also evaded the demands of 
other social actors, including a significant portion of the 
productive sector, as shown by the results presented by 
PINTEC [19]. 
Regarding the second question, concerning which social 
actors benefit most from S&T policies, the answer is: the 
research community. This actor has historically been in charge 
of setting the agenda, creating policy tools and evaluating 
policy results. STP in Brazil has, since its institutionalization, 
been a policy shaped by scientists and for scientists. 
One element that verifies the hegemonic position of the 
research community is the evident continuity of this policy, 
even in times of political and economic inflection, as in the 
1964 Military Coup and even during the process of state 
reform. These events brought new elements to the policy, but 
did not alter its core characteristics. In this sense, we may 
claim that the discourse surrounding STP changed so that the 
policy itself would not have to. 
These elements make it easier to answer the third of our 
proposed questions ("what difference does it make?"). To 
ensure the participation of a more diverse and comprehensive 
set of actors in the policy making process is an utmost 
commitment to true democracy. 
 In a country where most of the population is set apart from 
formal employment status and has no access to a range of 
basic services guaranteed by law, science and technology 
policies acquire a strategic importance. To widen policy goals 
  
in order to encompass social objectives is absolutely crucial. 
Last but not least, understanding how this public policy is 
shaped is critical to its improvement, to national development 
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